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I. INTRODUCTION
Little in the law hides as much as the names that politicians give pro-
posed legislation in order to make it politically attractive.  Just as Odys-
seus is said to have concealed his intentions and his soldiers in the Trojan
Horse, politicians have hidden their intentions and politically unattractive
proposals in Trojan Horse bills with names that divert attention from those
provisions to those that are more politically acceptable.
The largest tax increase to occur during the period from 1968 to 20061
was not named by its sponsors “The Largest Tax Increase of the Decade
Act.”  Instead, the increase was hidden in an act named the “Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.”2  Similarly, sponsors of The Ameri-
can Jobs Creating Act of 20043 probably found that name more politically
useful and palatable than an act titled something on the lines of the “Act
that Makes it $49 Billion More Expensive to Export” or “Tax Reductions
for Distillers and Whalers Act.”  The Act, however, did include provisions
that repealed $49 billion of export tax incentives, provided tax reductions
for producers of beer and liquor, and added a charitable contribution de-
* Erik Gordon is a clinical professor at the University of Michigan Ross School of
Business, associate director of the Zell Lurie Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies, and
Center for Private Equity and Venture Capital Finance.  He is the Managing Director of the
Wolverine Venture Fund and is active in the investment banking, mergers and acquisitions,
private equity and venture capital industries.  He served as the initial director Zell
Entrepreneurship and Law at University of Michigan Law School.
1. See Jerry Tempalski, Revenue Effects of Major Tax Bills, (U.S. Dep’t of the Trea-
sury, Office of Tax Analysis, OTA Working Paper 81, 2006), available at http://www.trea-
sury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/ Documents/ota81.pdf.
2. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
3. American Jobs Creating Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
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duction for whalers.4  The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act,5 too,
masks the inclusion of detrimental provisions and may not be the gift to
the claimed recipients that the name implies.
As it stands, it was not easy to get to that felicitous name.  Sponsors of
predecessor bills in the House of Representatives used titles such as
“Small Company Capital Formation,”6 “Entrepreneur Access to Capi-
tal,”7 and “Access to Capital for Job Creators.”8  The Senate saw bills la-
beled “Democratizing Access to Capital Act”9 and the “Capital Raising
Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act,”10 a
painful mouthful that tortuously assembles the acronym “CROWDFUND
Act.” The name “Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act” is politically use-
ful.  It frames the Act as a means of aiding startups, a more acceptable
goal in the political climate at the time of its passage than legislation
aimed at helping big companies and large hedge funds.  The fact that the
bill abbreviates to “JOBS Act” is also instrumental in situating it as legis-
lation that creates employment.11
Passing the Act was a rare bipartisan effort, with much discourse on
small businesspeople and entrepreneurs facing adversity in their attempts
to grow their startups and little spoken about big companies and large
hedge funds.12  In 2012, President Obama announced: “The JOBS Act will
allow Main Street small businesses and high-growth enterprises to raise
capital from investors more efficiently, allowing small and young firms
across the country to grow and hire faster . . . . These proposals will help
entrepreneurs raise the capital they need to put Americans back to work
. . . .”13 At the bill’s signing, House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) an-
4. KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004: CREAT-
ING JOBS FOR ACCOUNTANTS AND LAWYERS 2, 4 (2004).
5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
[hereinafter JOBS Act].
6. Small Company Capital Formation Act of 2011, H.R. 1070, 112th Cong. (2011).
7. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011).
8. Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (2011).
9. Democratizing Access to Capital Act, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011).
10. Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act,
S. 1970, 112th Cong. (2011).
11. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 1, 126 Stat. 306, 306 (2012).
12. See, e.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Legislative Package Com-
bines Financial Services Committee Bills into JOBS Act (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://
financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=282267 (describing the
bills included in the JOBS Act and stating, inter alia: “The bills that make up the legislative
package announced today came out of our committee with strong bipartisan support. They
will empower small businesses and entrepreneurs to invest, hire and expand.”; “The JOBS
Act is designed to help startups and entrepreneurs get off the ground, access investors and
create jobs.” (emphases added) Nowhere does the press release mention large companies or
hedge funds.).
13. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama To Sign
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act.
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nounced that “[t]he JOBS Act—a key part of the Republican jobs plan—
is good news for entrepreneurs and aspiring small businesspeople strug-
gling to overcome government barriers to job creation.”14  But, the Act’s
name is a Trojan Horse.  That is, given the size of the entities that can
utilize the Act’s provisions, the Act may be as likely to result in decreased
disclosure by large companies and more easily facilitated capital-raising by
hedge funds as it is to result in the increased employment spotlighted by
the Act’s sponsors.
This Comment will analyze which provisions of the Act are consistent
with the purpose that sponsors would have the public believe, that empha-
sized by the name “JOBS Act,” and distinguish them from those provi-
sions that serve as menacing soldiers hidden under the cover of a name
that diverts attention from the Act’s true purpose.
II. NOT EXACTLY EMERGING GROWTH COMPANIES
A primary focus of the JOBS Act is the newly-defined concept of
“emerging growth companies,” or EGCs.  Not only is this focus key, but
the label may also have been carefully and intentionally devised. Section
101(a) defines an “emerging growth company” as an issuer that has had
annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion during its most recently com-
pleted fiscal year.15 Is a company an emerging company simply because it
has less than $1 billion in annual revenue?
The word “emerging” is defined as “just beginning to exist or be no-
ticed”16 or “growing and developing.”17  Is an annual revenue of up to
$999,999,999 a credible indicator that a company is “just beginning to exist
or be noticed“?  That seems unlikely.  Companies do not generate revenue
of that order of magnitude at the beginning of their existence.  Nor are
they just beginning to be noticed.  Venture capital firms, private equity
firms, and, especially, underwriters who like to take them public, track
14. Press Release, Press Office of House Speaker John Boehner, Speaker Boehner:
JOBS Act Should Spark Further Bipartisan Action on the Economy (Ap. 4, 2012), http://
www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-jobs-act-should-spark-further-bipartisan-ac-
tion-economy.
15. JOBS Act § 101(a). Section 101(a) adds the definition of EGCs as new subsection
(19) of Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (2012). The $1
billion amount is indexed for inflation every five years. Id. An issuer that is an emerging
growth company as of the first day of that fiscal year remains one until the earliest of: (1) the
last day of the fiscal year in which the company has annual gross revenue of at least $1 billion
(indexed for inflation); (2) the last day of the fiscal year following the fifth anniversary of the
date of the first sale of common equity pursuant to a registration effected under Title 1 of the
JOBS Act; (3) the date on which the issuer has, during the previous three years, issued more
than $1 billion in nonconvertible debt; or (4) the date on which the company is deemed to be
a “large accelerated filer” under SEC regulations. Id.
16. Emerging – Definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, available at www.macmillondic-
tionary.com/us/dictionary/american/emerging (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
17. English Definition of “Emerging”, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, available
at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/american-english/emerging?q=emerging (last
visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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companies long before the companies attain revenues that large.  Alterna-
tively, is this revenue threshold a credible indicator that a company is
growing and developing? There is no obvious relationship between earn-
ing revenue of up to $999,999,999 in a given year and a company’s growth
or development.18  Because of these uncertainties, it is not clear that the
Act’s definition of an EGC truly matches the label and understanding of
an emerging growth company.
Under the definition of EGC, as written, most companies going public
qualify as emerging growth companies.  The inclusiveness of the definition
with respect to companies undertaking initial public offerings is inconsis-
tent, however, with the testimony of Kate Mitchell, managing director at
Scale Venture Partners and now-former chairman of the National Venture
Capital Association, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs.19  “To put the bill’s limited scope in perspective,”
Mitchell testified, “if the on-ramp provisions were in effect today, they
would apply to only 14 percent of public companies and only 3 percent of
total market capitalization, according to the IPO Task Force estimate.”20
The IPO Task Force, whose estimates Mitchell cites,21 is a self-appointed
group, of which Mitchell is a member.22  These figures are misleading if
18. There is no record of JOBS Act proponents citing evidence that associates an an-
nual revenue level of $1 billion with a company’s nascent existence or that indicates that the
set of companies with annual revenue of up to $1 billion are more likely to provide or create
employment than larger companies.
19. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 37 (2011)
[hereinafter Mitchell Testimony], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg
74930/pdf/CHRG-112shrg74930.pdf (prepared statement of Kate Mitchell, Managing Direc-
tor, Scale Venture Partners).
20. Id. at 39.
21. See id. at 38-42.
22. IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPA-
NIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 4 (2011) [hereinafter IPO
TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_
ipo_on-ramp.pdf. The IPO Task Force is the result of conversation among a working group at
a conference convened by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The IPO Task Force is com-
prised of: three venture capitalists, including Mitchell; one person from Wasatach Advisors
and one person from T. Rowe Price (identified as “public investors”); three persons identi-
fied as “entrepreneurs”; two securities attorneys; a professor at Harvard Business School, a
person from the S.E.C. Institute, and a private investor and retired head of PWC Tech Prac-
tice (collectively identified as “academicians/accountants,”); and five investment bankers. See
id. at 33-34. Per the slides accompanying the IPO Task Force’s report, the Task Force receives
additional support from “Investors, CEOs, NYSE, NASDAQ, [and the] NVCA[.]” IPO TASK
FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB
MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH (Slides) 3 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/acsec/ipotaskforceslides.pdf. While the group is distinguished and experienced,
its composition is weighted with persons and organizations whose self-interest in increased
IPO activity is noticeable. It is not obvious whether this self-interest influenced the Task
Force’s work. While the Task Force claims that it represents “the entire ecosystem of emerg-
ing growth companies,” IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 1, it does not seem to include
angel investors, first-time or aspiring entrepreneurs, employees of emerging growth compa-
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one draws from them the conclusion that the Act’s IPO provisions for
emerging growth companies would affect only 14 percent of IPOs under-
taken.  However, the 14 percent and 3 percent figures instead refer to all
existing public companies, regardless of when they went public.  That is,
among all currently existing public companies, including those that have
been public for decades, only 14 percent would qualify as emerging growth
companies under the Act.
In her testimony, Mitchell referenced Ford Motor Company as a public
company that would not today qualify as an emerging growth company
eligible for on-ramp treatment.23 Neither would companies such as Dow
Chemical Company and ExxonMobil.24 Yet, it is not clear why these com-
panies would figure in the denominator of a ratio offered in support of the
idea that the $1 billion in annual revenue definition of an emerging growth
company limits the application of the JOBS Act IPO provisions to a small
proportion of the relevant companies: those that are conducting an IPO.
By contrast, a report from Latham & Watkins contains numbers that seem
more relevant, because they are not predictions, but rather actual numbers
gathered from SEC filings and reports for the current time period.  The
report states that “[n]early 75% of issuers that priced a US IPO after April
5, 2012 [sic] [the effective date of the JOBS Act] identified themselves as
EGCs.”25  An Ernst & Young analysis asserts that “approximately 83% of
the IPOs that went effective since April 2012 were filed by EGCs.”26 Yet
another report says that over 90 percent of IPOs in 2011 would have quali-
fied for JOBS Act relief, had the provisions of the Act been available.27
Despite the attempt by the IPO Task Force to downplay the proportion of
companies that would benefit from the JOBS Act provisions,28 these
nies, accountants to smaller companies, lenders to emerging growth companies, or public or
private agencies that provide grants, incubator or accelerator services to emerging growth
companies.
23. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 19, at 39.
24. Both companies are large and long established publically traded firms with reve-
nue over $1 billion. See Dow Chemical Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 14, 2014);
Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2014).
25. LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, THE JOBS ACT AFTER ONE YEAR: A REVIEW OF THE
NEW IPO PLAYBOOK 2 (2013) [hereinafter NEW IPO PLAYBOOK], available at http://www.lw.
com/thoughtLeadership/jobs-act-after-one-year-review-of-new-ipo-playbook; see also PAUL,
WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, THE JOBS ACT: ONE YEAR LATER 9 (2013),
available at http://www.paulweiss.com/media/1602366/15apr13-jobs.pdf (“In the past year, ap-
proximately 75% of U.S. IPOs have been by EGCs.”).
26. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, THE JOBS ACT: ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY 4 (2013), http://
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/The_JOBS_Act:_One-year_anniversary/$FILE/JOBS
ActAnniversary_CC0368_9April2013.pdf.
27. WILLIS, JOBS ACT ANALYSIS 1 (2012), available at www.willis.com/Documents/
Publications/Industries/Financial_Institutions/June-2012-Issue-22-JOBS-ACT.pdf.
28. For example, the provisions scaling back the accounting disclosures required to do
an IPO (JOBS Act Sec. 102); relieving EGCs from the internal controls audit requirements
of Sec. 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (JOBS Act Sec. 103); loosening the restrictions on
communications with or by securities analysts (JOBS Act Sec. 105); providing a mechanism
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figures indicate that a majority of companies engaging in initial public of-
ferings after the Act’s enactment are, in fact, qualified to take advantage
of its exemptions.  And, given the $1 billion revenue threshold, these sta-
tistics are not very surprising.
Some of the companies going public may readily be suspected of not
truly being emerging growth companies for reasons beyond the large reve-
nues that they were generating at the time of their IPOs. According to the
Latham & Watkins report, of the 101 emerging growth companies that
priced IPOs in the time period covered,29 ten were real estate investment
trusts and eleven were master limited partnerships.30 Neither category,
real estate investment trusts or master limited partnerships, is likely to
include many companies that are emerging growth companies in the com-
mon sense understanding of the term.31 During the same timeframe, five
formerly public companies that had gone private priced IPOs as emerging
growth companies under the Act, and two more were in registration at the
time of the report.32  In similar fashion, these companies’ re-entrance to
the public market is not likely to have been an emergence from anything
other than ownership by private equity funds, bolstering the notion that
not all companies meeting the technical definition of an EGC are, in fact,
emerging growth.
Proponents of the Act and, more specifically, the notion of “emerging
growth companies” included therein, justified their necessity by making
much of the decline in the number of IPOs.  For example, the report of the
IPO Task Force says, “[d]uring the past 15 years, the number of emerging
growth companies entering the capital markets through IPOs has plum-
meted relative to historical norms.”33  The Task Force attributed the de-
cline, in part, to expensive regulatory provisions34 that disproportionately
burden the small companies that provide job growth.35  “[T]he IPO Task
Force has concluded that the cumulative effect of a sequence of regulatory
actions, rather than one single event, lies at the heart of the crisis.”36  In
response to these conclusions, the Task Force proposed a number of roll-
backs to these regulatory actions.37 In addition to the regulatory costs im-
for confidential filing of drafts of a company’s IPO registration statement (JOBS Act Sec.
106); allowing EGCs to “test the waters” before going public by communicating with speci-
fied potential investors prior to or after the filing of a registration statement (JOBS Act Sec.
105).
29. See id. at 18 n.2.
30. NEW IPO PLAYBOOK, supra note 25, at 4.
31. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
32. NEW IPO PLAYBOOK, supra note 25, at 4.
33. IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
34. Id. at 9-10 (citing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act).
35. Id. at 8; see also Mitchell Testimony, supra note 19, at 6-7 (statement of Kate
Mitchell, Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners).
36. IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
37. Id. at 17-18.
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posed on IPO candidates, the IPO Task Force report claims that the rise of
short-term, high-frequency trading makes it more difficult for small com-
panies to go public.38  The claimed chain of causation is that the move
from fractional to decimal prices for shares (a regulatory change) and the
rise of electronic markets (a technological change) has driven the increase
in short-term, high-frequency trading.39  Such trading has shifted the at-
tention of investment banks and brokers who formerly sold IPOs of small,
emerging companies (and their analysts who followed those emerging
companies) away from emerging company IPOs and toward the higher
returns that can be made in trading.40
Although regulatory actions are under the spotlight and partially
blamed for the decline in IPOs,41 no studies of the sort commonly used by
regulatory agencies to buttress claimed economic effects of proposed ac-
tions are cited in support of this claim.  Despite asserting that decimal pric-
ing has had a negative effect on emerging company IPOs, the IPO Task
Force does not recommend reverting to fractional pricing of shares instead
of decimal pricing.  Nor does the Task Force recommend restrictions on
the high-frequency trading it claims has diverted the attention of invest-
ment bankers from small company IPOs.42 Given the Task Force’s atten-
tion on “rebuilding the IPO on-ramp” and on the damage done to IPOs by
high-frequency trading, the omission of any recommendations that would
directly address such trading and potentially shift the balance of invest-
ment bank profitability back toward IPO activity is surprising.
The claims of Act proponents in favor of rollbacks of selected provi-
sions of existing securities law ultimately boil down to these: certain roll-
backs are needed, and such rollbacks will result in the consummation of a
greater number of IPOs of companies that are emerging and are growing,
all of which will have the intended result of creating more jobs. So far, the
data is not highly supportive of the proponents’ second claim that securi-
ties law rollbacks will increase the number of IPOs.  According to an arti-
cle informed by Dealogic analytics, an average of 33 IPOs per quarter
were done in the year prior to the effective date of the IPO on-ramp provi-
sions of the Act, and 31 per quarter in the year after.43  With regard to
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 14.
41. IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 13-15.
42. Id. The IPO Task Force also does not consider the possibility that while larger
spreads and commissions could fund more analyst research, there is no assurance that it
would fund research in emerging growth companies where the opportunities to earn commis-
sions is lower than in shares of the large-capitalization companies favored by high-frequency
traders. Nor does the Task Force consider the possibility that larger spreads and commissions
would impose costs on purchasers of shares in emerging companies.
43. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Year Later, the Missed Opportunity of the JOBS Act,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jun. 11, 2013, 5:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/a-
year-later-the-missed-opportunity-of-the-jobs-act/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_
type=blogs&_r=1.
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IPOs that raised less than $100 million—more likely to be IPOs of smaller,
emerging companies than are higher dollar value IPOs—an average of 15
per quarter were done prior to the Act, and only 13 per quarter after the
Act.44  The proponent’s insistence that more lenient treatment of emerg-
ing growth companies under the securities laws will spur IPO activity by
those companies, then, has simply not proved true.
III. REDUCING THE AUDIT AND OTHER DISCLOSURES REQUIRED OF
EMERGING GROWTH COMPANIES
Title I of the Act, captioned “Reopening American Capital Markets to
Emerging Growth Companies,” scales back the accounting disclosures
that companies are required to make upon launching initial public offer-
ings.45  The section also exempts EGCs from the internal controls audit
requirements of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,46 as well as
any future rules that may require either audit firm rotation or supplements
to auditor reports, thereby necessitating the provision of additional infor-
mation about the audit and the company’s financial statements.47  Finally,
it loosens the restrictions on communications with or by securities analysts
with respect to initial public offerings of emerging growth companies.48
Prior to the passage of the Act, all companies filing for an IPO were
required to provide audited income statements and cash flow statements
for the preceding three years and audited balance sheets for the preceding
two years.49  Under the JOBS Act regime, emerging growth companies
must submit only two years of audited income, cash flow and balance
sheet statements.50 Again, in contrast to past requirements, Title I now
permits emerging growth companies to draft “management discussion and
analysis”51 for only the periods for which they provide audited state-
ments.52  This relief is not trivial.  The so-called “MD&A” is manage-
ment’s detailed discussion and analysis of the reporting period’s financial
performance, along with forward-looking information about the possible
effects of future events and conditions.53  Drafting the so-called “MD&A”
is “usually the most challenging portion of the [IPO] prospectus to
44. Id.
45. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102, 126 Stat. 306, 308 (2012).
46. See id. § 103.
47. Id. § 104.
48. Id. § 105.
49. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-02(a) (2013).
50. JOBS Act § 102(b)(1).
51. SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2013) (requiring “management discussion
and analysis” which consists of laborious drafting, reviewing, and revision by top manage-
ment, with the involvement of legal counsel, accountants, and investment bankers).
52. JOBS Act § 102(c).
53. See JOSHUA ROSENBAUM &JOSHUA PEARL, INVESTMENT BANKING 24 (2d ed.
2013).
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draft.”54  The MD&A in the prospectus for the Twitter IPO—Twitter went
public as an “emerging growth company”—is 36 pages long.55
The Act also eliminates various disclosures regarding executive com-
pensation,56 which had been imposed two years earlier in the Dodd-Frank
Act.57  Furthermore, while it is not clear that the wording of the JOBS Act
requires it, the SEC has taken the reasonable position that an emerging
growth company that is required to provide only two years of audited
statements when seeking to go public will be similarly required to provide
only two years of the “selected financial data” required in Item 30158 of
Regulation S-K.59
This rollback of requirements with respect to audited financial state-
ments,60 management discussion and analysis,61 and disclosures of execu-
tive compensation62 could save substantial accounting fees and
management effort for EGCs that go public under the provisions of the
Act.  An analysis conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP of over 380
IPOs between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2012, indicates that, for issuers
with annual revenue below $100 million, pre-JOBS Act external audits
cost an average of $800,000.63  For issuers with at least ten times that an-
nual revenue, the average cost was $1.2 million.64 These audit costs un-
doubtedly burden small issuers disproportionately: they constitute a larger
portion of a small issuer’s revenues and, if an issuer is profitable, a larger
portion of its profits.
The cost savings to smaller companies that results from the Act’s di-
minished audited financials requirement, and therefore reduced account-
ing fees, is likely to be proportionally larger than one might expect.  The
54. DAVID A. WESTENBERG, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
GOING PUBLIC § 13.2.1.J (2d ed. 2013).
55. See Twitter, Inc. Prospectus, Registration No. 333-191552 (Nov. 6, 2013) available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000119312513431301/d564001d424b4.htm.
56. Id. § 102(a).
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1(e) (2012) (amending
15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e) (2010)) (expanding the exemptions to emerging growth companies).
58. Item 301 of Reg S-K generally requires companies to provide five years of “se-
lected financial data” that includes, inter alia: net sales or operating revenues; income or loss
from continuing operations; income of loss from continuing operations per common share;
total assets; long-term obligations; and cash dividends declared per common share. SEC Reg.
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2013).
59. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions, Question 11,
U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (April 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfj-
jobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm.
60. JOBS Act § 102(b).
61. Id. § 102(c).
62. Id. § 102(a).
63. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CONSIDERING AN IPO?: THE COSTS OF GOING
AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU 6 (2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/
transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf.
64. Id. at 8.
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reason is two-fold.  First, it is more difficult, and thus more expensive, for
accounting firms to conduct the tests required to certify financial state-
ments when such tests involve matters further in the past.  Second, it is
unlikely that the older accounting records of small, growing companies,
collected at a time when such companies were even smaller, are in the
same condition as their more recent records. The reduction to two years of
audited income and cash flow statements and of selected financial data
required by Item 30165 is, therefore, consistent with the claims of the Act’s
proponents that the costs of preparing an IPO can be disproportionately
high for small companies and, so, ought to be mitigated.  On the other
hand, applying the reduction to companies that generate hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in revenue, and yet still meet the criteria for emerging
growth companies, is not consistent with that claim.66
Act proponents’ belief that compliance with the internal controls audit
requirements of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an impedi-
ment to going public, despite both the existing exemption for companies
with a public float of less than $75 million and the existing compliance
transition period for all new public companies,67 is similarly well-founded.
Smaller, private companies considering an IPO have rarely spent the
money and time required to establish the processes and controls required
of public companies by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  While the absolute costs
may be less for small companies than for large companies, there is a floor
on the cost of implementing the requisite controls that creates a dispropor-
tionate impact on small companies.68  This provision of the Act is, too,
inconsistent with the goals of its proponents.
65. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions, Question 11,
U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (April 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfj-
jobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm.
66. It is unclear what proportion of larger companies will, in actuality, be helped by
the Act’s rollback of financial requirements. Many such companies will have taken in venture
capital or obtained large commercial loans. Venture capital investors and lenders of large
sums of money often require certified financial statements. If the investment or loans were
made more than two years prior to an IPO, the company may already have three years of
audited statements and paid the fees that attend their preparation, therefore escaping any
reduction in audit expense at the time of the IPO. This assumes that the audits have been
performed by CPA firms acceptable to the underwriters of the IPO. If the audits have been
performed by local CPA firms that the underwriter is not familiar with, for example, the
company’s statements may have to be re-audited, in which case the Act provisions would
save the company at least some re-audit fees.
67. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 19, at 8.
68. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 63, at 13 (estimating that the pre-IPO
costs of preparing for compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley as a whole, not just Section 404, are to
be between $100,000 and just under $500,000, that is likely that smaller companies are on the
low end of the range, and that large companies with complex or distributed operations are on
the high end).
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IV. EASING THE RESTRICTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
DURING THE IPO PROCESS
In the period leading to the Act’s passage, JOBS Act proponents
claimed that investment research coverage had decreased in prior years,
and that the decrease had “adversely impact[ed] trading volumes, com-
pany market capitalizations and the total mix of information available to
market participants.”69  They did not explain, however, how such lower
trading volumes caused a reduction in the number of emerging growth
company IPOs (ostensible job generators) or the link between decreased
research coverage of companies and their lower market capitalizations.
Nor did the Act proponents provide evidence to support their claim that
less coverage by investment banker or brokerage-based analysts has re-
sulted in “less transparency and visibility into emerging growth companies
for investors . . . .”70
Their claim is not self-evident, particularly in an era of constant televi-
sion and online investment news and punditry. These pundits and news-
casters arguably provide as much insight as analysts, whose reports,
especially on smaller companies, often consist mainly of rehashing and dis-
tributing to clients information already made public by company manage-
ment. Nevertheless, companies considering launching an IPO often do
consider analyst coverage important, particularly when selecting under-
writers.71 In fact, the perceived importance of favorable and influential
analyst coverage of a company considering an IPO led over time to the
phenomena of analysts becoming active players in the sales pitches that
investment bankers made to prospective IPO clients and analyst compen-
sation and career advancement becoming directly linked to the investment
bankers’ success in attracting business.72
The perceived abuses related to the conflict of interest between ana-
lysts’ provision of informational reports and their compensation in con-
junction with investment bankers’ attraction of business resulted in
69. IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 26.
70. Id. at 14.
71. DAVID A. WESTENBERG, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
GOING PUBLIC 10 (2013) (“The caliber and reputations of the research analysts employed by
prospective managing underwriters often sway a company’s decision.”).
72. NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
A COMMITTEE CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. AND NASD AT THE
REQUEST OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 (2003).
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legislation,73 enforcement action, including the 2003 Global Settlement,74
and rule making75—each of which was designed to reduce the problems
inherent in the noted conflicts of interest.  The JOBS Act has loosened the
extensive restrictions on the manner and timeframes within which analysts
and others are permitted to communicate with management and potential
buyers of emerging growth company IPO shares.  For example, the Act
adds Section 15D(c)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.76  Section
15D(c)(2) limits the applicability of existing Section 15D(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 to emerging growth companies.  Section 15D(a)
broadly separates research analysts from investment bankers.77 Under
new Section 15D(c)(2), however, neither the SEC nor any national securi-
ties association registered under Section 15A78 can adopt or maintain any
rule or regulation with respect to the IPO of an emerging growth company
that restricts an analyst from participating in any communications with
company management that also is attended by an investment banker.79
Nor can the SEC or any national securities association restrict an invest-
ment banker from arranging for communications between an analyst and a
potential investor.80
Because the JOBS Act does not expressly overrule the 2003 Global
Settlement, it is possible that the major investment banks that settled
under that agreement may be unable to avail themselves of the return to
past practices signaled by the Act’s passage, whereby investment bankers
could bring analysts to meetings with prospective IPO clients or send them
to talk to potential investors in an emerging growth company’s IPO.  Yet,
73. See Section 15D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (2012),
added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 791
(2002). Section 15D(a) mandates, inter alia, the adoption of rules to establish institutional
and structural safeguards to assure that analysts are separated by appropriate informational
partitions within their firms from review, oversight or pressure from investment bankers. It
also mandates the adoption of rules that restrict the prepublication clearance or approval of
research reports by investment bankers or others not directly responsible for investment re-
search, that keep investment bankers out of analyst compensation decisions, and that forbid
investment bankers from retaliating or threatening to retaliate against analysts who produce
unfavorable reports that may adversely affect existing or prospective investment banking
relationships.
74. See, e.g., 2003 Global Settlement, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.
finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/DisciplinaryActions/2003GlobalSettlement/
(The global settlement requires, inter alia, the settling investment banks to physically sepa-
rate investment bankers from analysts, keep investment bankers out of compensation and
assignment decisions regarding analysts, and to prohibit analysts from participating in efforts
to solicit investment banking business, including IPO business, and including analyst partici-
pation in IPO roadshows.).
75. See e.g., NYSE Rule 472; NASD Rule 2711; 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.501-.502 (2014).
76. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105(b), 126 Stat. 306, 311 (2012).
77. Exchange Act § 15D(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a).
78. Id. § 78o-3.
79. JOBS Act § 105(b).
80. Id.
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Act proponents recommend a return to such practices,81 precisely those
associated with the unsavory and allegedly illegal practices that helped
float the emerging company IPOs of the dot-com era.  A return to looser
boundaries between research analysts, investment bankers, and investors
may or may not increase the number of IPOs and, therefore, instigate job
creation, as proponents suggest. However, in either case, the reversion le-
gitimized by the Act is an affront to the protections that were imposed in
the wake of revelations of past practices that were shocking, at least to
persons not familiar with investment banking culture.  It is with good rea-
son, then, that sponsors of the JOBS Act did not title it the “Repeal the
Protections We Gave You After We Discovered What Investment Bankers
Did During the Dot-Com Boom Act,” though this is evidently what the
Act has accomplished in one respect.
In addition to renewed interactions between analysts and investment
bankers, the timing of analyst reports has also changed significantly post-
JOBS Act.  Under federal securities law, analyst research reports are con-
sidered offers of securities.82  It is unlawful to offer to sell a security prior
to filing a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.83  The result, prior to the JOBS Act, was the imposition of “quiet
periods”84 before, during, and after registration of an IPO, during which
analysts were not permitted to release research reports.85  The prohibition
on release of analyst reports began prior to the filing of a registration
statement and persisted for up to 40 days after the offering for a managing
underwriter (or 25 days for other underwriters), as well as for 15 days
before and after the expiration of an underwriter lock-up period.86
The JOBS Act removed the “quiet period” prohibitions on research
reports regarding emerging growth companies, including those from the
underwriters of a company’s IPO, both with respect to reports published
prior to the filing of a registration statement87 and reports published after
the IPO has gone effective.88 As a result, reports with information con-
81. IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 28-29.
82. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012) (defining “offer” to
include “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or
interest in a security, for value.” The section has been interpreted broadly to include reports
issued by brokers, because these reports are published to produce commissions.).
83. Securities Act § 5(c), id. § 77e(c).
84. See generally Securities Act § 2(a)(3), id. § 77b(a)(3); Securities Act § 5(c), id.
§ 77e(c); FINRA MANUAL § 2711(f).
85. See FINRA MANUAL §2711(f).
86. Id.
87. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105(a), 126 Stat. 306, 310 (2012) (amending Sec-
tion 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 by adding language that says that the publication of
a research report about an emerging growth company that is proposing an IPO of its com-
mon stock is not an offer to sell a security for the purposes of Section 5(c) of the Securities
Act).
88. Id. § 105(c) (amending Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(2012), by adding subsection (d)).
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cerning an emerging growth company may now be issued to the public
prior to the filing of a registration statement and after the registration is
deemed effective and the IPO is sold, all without the previously imposed
blackout periods.
This change helps the companies going public that really are too small
to attract attention from analysts other than those associated with the
companies’ underwriters.  Prior to the change, the IPOs of those compa-
nies suffered from a lack of attention and interest from prospective buyers
of the IPO shares because they could not easily obtain information about
the companies that would facilitate making a decision to purchase the
shares.89  The only analysts who had a reason to invest in producing re-
ports about such small companies were the analysts of the underwriter,
and they were prohibited from publishing reports during the quiet period.
V. CONFIDENTIAL FILING OF DRAFT REGISTRATION STATEMENTS
While certain provisions of the JOBS Act represent reductions to the
stringency of regulations previously imposed on companies seeking to go
public, at least with respect to emerging growth companies, the Act also
added an entirely new process to the regulatory framework, which permits
EGCs to submit a draft of its registration statement to the SEC for review
on a confidential basis.90  The confidential draft, and all amendments
thereto, must be publicly filed at least 21 days prior to commencement of
any IPO road show.91  Though referred to as a “draft,” the confidential
submission should not be incomplete.  The SEC has indicated that it ex-
pects drafts to both be substantially complete and include a signed audit
report of the registered public accounting firm that prepared the required
financial statements.92
Act proponents claim that companies are reluctant to undertake the
process of going public because doing so requires publicly filing informa-
tion that might be useful to competitors prior to knowing whether the SEC
is likely to declare the company’s registration statement effective.93  The
new procedure offers some relief by permitting a company to privately
embark on the registration statement comment and response period with
89. See the similar observations made by the IPO Task Force. IPO TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 22, at 13-15.
90. Id. § 106(a) (amending Section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f, by
adding subsection (e)).
91. “Road show” is defined as an offer (other than a statutory prospectus or portion
thereof) that contains a presentation regarding an offering by one or more members of the
issuer’s management and includes discussion by a member of management of the issuer (the
company), the securities being offered, or of the management, itself. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.433(h)(4) (2014).
92. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions, Question 7, U.S.
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (April 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjjob-
sactfaq-title-i-general.htm.
93. IPO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 29.
Spring 2014] The JOBS Act Trojan Horse 227
the SEC to gauge whether such negotiations are likely to be successful,
and to abandon the process if they are not, without releasing confidential
information to the public or competitors.94 If the company does proceed
with its IPO, the information is released when the formerly confidential
information is filed publicly.95
The need for confidential draft filing provisions, though available only
to EGCs, seems to be unrelated to a company’s status as emerging or
growing.  The companies that are likely to legitimately use the provisions,
if their purpose is truly to encourage companies to go public, are compa-
nies with peculiar characteristics that make it difficult for the actors in-
volved in the IPO process—namely, experienced accountants, attorneys,
and investment bankers—to predict issues that are likely to require nego-
tiations and result in delays during the SEC’s process of reviewing the
filing, and possible resolutions of them.  Problems and difficulties that may
cause a company to abandon its effort to go public do not necessarily arise
because of a company’s size; rather, they arise because a company wishes
to use disclosure methods and materials that differ from traditional
disclosures.96
The types of companies that tend to use nontraditional disclosures typ-
ically exist in fields where there are new business models for which tradi-
tional methods of analysis are insufficient, and where new risks and other
types of material information are present.  For example, consider a com-
pany that (1) is not generating revenue, (2) has no definitive plan for gen-
erating revenue, and (3) is adding non-revenue-generating users who are
expected to be “sticky,”—that is, because of network effects, they are ex-
pected to remain users over an extended period.  The company may con-
tend that having such a network is a valuable asset that can be monetized
in some way in the future. What exactly should the company be allowed to
disclose about the potential value of the network?  It is precisely this lack
of certainty about what should and can be disclosed about this network in
94. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 19, at 42 (prepared statement of Kate Mitchell,
Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners). It is important to note that the confidential
filing of a draft registration statement is not considered the filing of a registration statement
under Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. Therefore, care should be taken not to make
an offer to sell stock prior to a non-confidential filing of a registration statement with the
SEC.
95. JOBS Act § 106(a) (amending Section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77f, by adding subsection (e), under which the initial confidential filing and all amendments
must be publicly filed not later than 21 days prior to the date the issuer conducts a road
show).
96. For example, a company whose business prospects cannot be measured by tradi-
tional means and wishes to instead use supplemental, nontraditional measures that, at the
time are new, to the SEC. For example, GrubHub used the metric “Daily Average Grubs.”
See GrubHub Inc., Prospectus, Registration No. 333-194219 (April 1, 2014), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1594109/000119312514125249/d647121ds1a.htm. Twitter
used the metrics “Tweets per day” and “impressions of Tweets.” See Twitter, Inc. Prospectus,
Registration No. 333-191552 (Nov. 6, 2013) available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1418091/000119312513431301/d564001d424b4.htm.
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the offering statement filed with the SEC that makes the hypothetical
company uncertain as to whether it will actually complete an IPO. Where
uncertainty such as this exists, confidential submission is well-suited.
However, the metric that allows a company to qualify as an EGC and,
therefore, to take advantage of the new confidential draft procedure is
based on annual revenue and unrelated to the relevant uncertainty that
troubles companies.  That makes the metric unlikely to accurately sort
companies into those that need the benefit of the confidential draft proce-
dure in order to go public, and those companies that would go public with
or without the benefit of the confidential draft procedure. As such, the
metric is poorly-crafted to accomplish the stated goal of encouraging com-
panies with peculiar uncertainties to go public.
VI. TESTING THE IPO WATERS
As part of its “IPO on-ramp,” the JOBS Act also includes a provision
that allows emerging growth companies to “test the waters” before going
public by communicating with certain potential investors, those that are
qualified institutional buyers97 or institutions that are accredited inves-
tors,98 either prior to or following the filing of a registration statement.
Prior to the JOBS Act, companies could not test the waters with potential
investors before going through the expense and effort of preparing and
filing a registration statement.99  The specific purpose of this allowance
appears to be to give emerging growth companies the opportunity to de-
termine whether such investors might be interested in the IPO.100
Despite its goal, this provision seems unlikely to succeed in helping
small, emerging companies because the size of their public offering, and,
therefore, the public float of their stock, is likely to be too insubstantial to
attract many institutional investors.  When coupled with the fact that there
is no limit on the size of an emerging growth company’s IPO, the provision
might instead make life easier for underwriters and issuers of public offer-
ings that are large enough to be attractive to institutional investors
(though they may still be considered EGCs).  Indeed, underwriters will be
able to begin sounding out their stable of institutional investors at an ear-
lier point in the process, thus enabling the investment banks to give com-
panies more accurate predictions about the likely IPO price and size that
the market will be willing to accept. Even if this is the case, it remains
unclear whether providing more accurate predictions to a company at an
earlier point in the IPO process will result in the consummation of more
public offerings, as the Act’s proponents claim, or will lead to fewer IPOs.
That is, in contrast to the proponents’ beliefs, if companies can abandon
97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2013).
98. Id. § 230.501(a).
99. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15, U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
100. JOBS Act § 105(c) (amending Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (2012), by adding subsection (d)).
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the IPO process earlier with less sunk costs as a result of enhanced infor-
mation about the offering’s prospects, they may actually be less likely to
continue the IPO process to completion.
Another point of uncertainty resides in the fact that it is also not clear
that underwriters will disclose to investors information that is negative
and, at that time, still confidential, during the “testing the waters”
phase.101  Underwriters may instead be tempted to withhold information
regarding a disclosure disagreement with the SEC in the hope that it will
be resolved before the company has to reveal the disagreement in its pub-
lic filing. The feedback that the underwriters get from potential investors
during the confidential phase may, then, be more positive than the reac-
tion that they receive after the public filing of the confidential draft and all
amendments thereto reveals the disagreement.102  Under this chain of
events, the information that the company obtains from testing the waters
under the confidential filing process may be far less accurate than it would
be had the filing simply been public.  Thus, another potential consequence,
unforeseen perhaps by Act proponents, of making public offering deci-
sions on the basis of information from testing the waters is that those deci-
sions may be of lower quality.
VII. CONCLUSION
The JOBS Act is a political amalgamation of at least five bills, three of
which originated in the House of Representatives103 and two of which
originated in the Senate.104  Supporters of the JOBS Act, both Demo-
crat105 and Republican,106 claimed that the intention of the Act was to
stimulate job creation.  And, at least facially, the provisions discussed in
this Comment—reducing the cost and burden of financial disclosures; eas-
ing restrictions on analyst communications during the IPO process; al-
101. The waters could be tested under JOBS Act Section 105(d) at a time when the only
filings are confidential drafts permitted under JOBS Act Section 106(a).
102. JOBS Act § 106(a) (adding subsection (e)(1) to Section 6 of the Securities Act of
1933, which requires the public filing with the SEC of the initial confidential draft and all
amendments no later than 21 days before the commencement of the company’s road show);
see also supra note 88.
103. Small Company Capital Formation Act, H.R. 1070, 112th Cong. (2011); Entrepre-
neur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011); Access to Capital for Job Cre-
ators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (2011).
104. Democratizing Access to Capital Act, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011); Capital Raising
Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act, S. 1970, 112th Cong.
(2011).
105. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama To Sign
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act.
106. Press Release, Press Office of House Speaker John Boehner, Speaker Boehner:
JOBS Act Should Spark Further Bipartisan Action on the Economy (Ap. 4, 2012), http://
www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-jobs-act-should-spark-further-bipartisan-ac-
tion-economy.
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lowing emerging growth companies to file confidential drafts of their
registration materials; and testing the IPO waters—seem to be related to
that stated goal.  However, examination of those provisions in light of the
new meaning of “emerging growth company,” a company with annual
gross revenues of less than $1 billion during its most recently completed
fiscal year,107 reveals that the Act is less what it is claimed to be—a job
creator—and more a Trojan Horse.  Hidden in this Trojan Horse of a bill
is the very real possibility that companies that are neither startups, nor
emerging, nor the job creators that proponents of the Act touted, may
benefit from the law more than anyone else.
107. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101(a), 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012).
